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Microfinance Apex Organizations in West Africa: The Case of Benin 1 
Korotoumou Ouattara and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I 
Introduction 
A. Rationale and Objectives 
This report presents a case study among several undertaken by investigators of the Rural 
Finance Program at The Ohio State University in collaboration with the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (CGAP). The purpose of the research project is to gain a better understanding of the role, 
criteria of operations, and successes and challenges of apex organizations in their support of the 
development of sustainable microfinance organizations (MFOs). The objective is to examine the 
rationale for the existence and evaluate the performance of apex organizations by deriving lessons 
from the experience of a few representative examples of this instrument for the promotion of 
micro finance. 
This report focuses on West Africa, and it includes two case studies from Benin, namely the 
Pro jet d 'Appui au Developpement des Micro Entreprises (P ADME) and the Federation des Caisses 
d'Epargne et de Credit Mutuel (FECECAM). These case studies illustrate the difficulties of 
promoting microfinance in countries with very low per capita incomes, disperse rural populations, 
and subject to significant exogenous shocks that increase the risks faced by poor household-firms 
and the organizations that lend to them. 
The recommendations from the case studies are meant to provide CGAP and the donor 
community with rigorous criteria and cost-effective tools to design better policies to reach poor 
household-firms via microfinance. The main questions addressed by the study are the following: 
(a) How successful have been particular apex organizations? 
2 
Report on a case study prepared after a field visit by Korotoumou Ouattara, as part of the 
CGAP-OSU research project on Microfinance Apex Mechanisms. The opinions expressed 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the sponsoring organizations. 
Ouattara is Research Specialist and Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural, Environ-
mental, and Development Economics and Director of the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio 
State University. The authors are grateful to Mohini Malhotra and Richard Rosenberg for 
their comments and support. 
1 
• 
(b) What are likely determinants of this success? How generalizable are the observed 
preconditions for success to other apex organizations that operate in similar environments? 
( c) What difference has the apex organization made in the development of the micro finance 
industry in the particular country? 
( d) What lessons can be learned about worse or better organizational designs of the apex 
mechanisms from the experience of the particular case study? 
B. Selection of the Organizations 
The organizations analyzed in this report were selected from a preliminary inventory of 
microfinance organizations engaged in apex activities in Africa. For the purposes of this research 
project, an apex organization was defined as a wholesaling, second-tier mechanism created to 
facilitate the disbursement of funds and the development of the sustainable capacity of retailing 
microfinance organizations.3 Apex organizations can be defined both by their operation with 
retailing microfinance organizations and by the provision of one or more of the following services: 
(a) the wholesaling of loanable funds on behalf of donors and governments, 
(b) the screening and certification of microfinance organizations that fulfill certain eligibility 
criteria, 
( c) the operation of loan-guarantee facilities, 
(d) institution-building support in the form of technical assistance and/or training of the staff of 
retailing microfinance organizations, and 
( e) the prudential supervision of micro finance organizations. 
Although the research project has examined several of these functions that the apex 
organization may perform, it has primarily focused on the apex efforts to create sustainable capacity 
at the retailing micro finance levels as well as on the sustainability of the apex organization itself. 
Given a generalized scarcity of microfinance apex organizations with sufficient experience 
in Africa, Benin was chosen for the implementation of field research after the realization that this 
country hosts several organizations that meet the criteria for an apex outlined above. These 
organizations are P ADME, AFRICARE, and FECECAM. 
These organizations were visited in November 1997 to gain a deeper understanding of their 
operations.4 Several interviews were conducted at all levels, starting with the management, staff 
3 
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For a conceptual framework for the research project, see Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 
"Microfinance Apex Mechanisms: Concepts, Synthesis of Lessons, and Recommendations," 
Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1998. 
Koro Ouattara was in Cotonou November 4-29, 1997. The trip also included the observation 
of village banking programs for the purposes of another research project (Korotoumou 
Ouattara and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, ... ). 
2 
members, and board officials of the organizations. Partner NGOs were also visited and interviewed. 
Finally, several clients were visited in Cotonou and other more rural towns to elicit their insights and 
expectations about the organization. Documents and available data were collected. These materials, 
along with interview responses, form the basis of the information reported here.5 
It is fair to state that the organizations selected for this case study have demonstrated some 
degree of success in their operations despite the formidable obstacles faced by any microfinance 
organization in this environment. Further progress will be needed, however, for a more successful 
development of the micro finance industry in Benin. 
The first case study, about PADME, is an example of an organization pushed by donors to 
undertake apex responsibilities without being prepared for such a task. The relationship of P ADME 
with AFRICARE, which initiated the apex role of PADME, is highlighted. This situation is not 
unique. Several comparatively successful MFOs have been asked by donors to play the role of apex 
mechanisms, in recognition both of their relative strengths and of the difficulties of creating new 
institutions in these countries. This dual role creates a tension between the wholesaling and the 
retailing functions of the organization and, as in the case ofK-REP in Kenya, the apex activities are 
eventually abandoned. 6 
The second case study describes FECECAM, an apex organization that oversees the largest 
credit union network in West Africa. The report shows that FECECAM is still defining and 
perfecting its role as a financial intermediary. Some relevant questions still remain: can and should 
FECECAM be used to expand the frontier of the microfinance industry in Benin? Can and should 
FECECAM be replicated? How do these experiences compare to those of similar organizations in 
other West African countries? 
C. Organization of the Report 
The report starts by placing the study in context and by describing, in Chapter II, the 
economic environment in which these apex organizations operate. Chapter III analyzes P ADME, 
while Chapter IV focuses on FECECAM. Chapter III also discusses the relationship between 
P ADME and AFRICARE, while Chapter IV contrasts FECECAM to other federations of credit 
cooperatives in West Africa. Chapter 5 offers conclusions and recommendations for the donor 
community. 
5 
6 
Given the short duration of the visit and limitations of the information available, this report 
should not be interpreted as a complete evaluation of these organizations, but more as an 
opportunity to generate some lessons about microfinance apex organizations in very poor 
countries from the experiences of these organizations. 
This process may be contrasted with the trend, particularly in small countries, of apex 
organizations that eventually start their own retailing operations. 
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II 
The Economic Environment in Benin 
A. General Information on Benin 
The country of Benin, former Dahomey, is located in West Africa, and it covers a land area 
of 112,622 sq. km. It is bordered on the south by the Atlantic Ocean, on the northeast by Niger, on 
the northwest by Burkina Faso, on the east by Nigeria, and on the west by Togo. The country is 
subdivided into six regions or departments: Atacora (northwest region), Borgou (northeast region), 
Zou (central region), Mono (southeast region), Atlantique (south central region), and Oueme 
(southeast region). 
The population of Benin is 5.7 million inhabitants, of which 51 percent are women (1996 
IMF estimates). Given an annual growth rate of 3 percent, the population is expected to reach 6.3 
million by the year 2000. Population density is 44 people per square kilometer. Almost three-
quarters of the population live, however, in the southern half of the country, and the south has a 
population density of over 120 people per square kilometer. The Capital City of Benin is Porto-
Novo, with 450,000 inhabitants, and it is located in the Oueme department (Map). This is still a 
comparatively low rate of population density.7 The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of the 
population live in rural areas. 
The official language in Benin is French, although there are approximately 20 ethnic groups 
that speak several different African languages. More than half the population speaks Fon while 
Yoruba, Mina, Bariba, and Dendi are other important languages. Over half the population in Benin 
are animists and voodoo believers, while 15 percent are Christian and 15 percent are Muslim. The 
literacy rate in Benin is 37 percent for the entire population, 49 percent for the male population, and 
17 percent among women. This literacy rate is about 25 percentage points below that in neighboring 
West African countries. A poorly educated population reduces the economic opportunities available 
to the poor, and it shrinks the pool of human resources available for the staff and management of 
microfinance organizations. 
7 Although per capita income in Benin is slightly higher than in Bangladesh, the much higher 
density of population in Bangladesh creates a very different environment for the development 
ofmicrofinance (Nagarajan and Gonzalez-Vega, 1998). 
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Figure 1. Map of Benin 
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B. The Economy 
With a Gross National Product per capita of US$ 370 in 1995, according to World Bank 
estimates, Benin is one of the poorest countries in the world. Gross Domestic Product per capita was 
US $ 418 in 1996. Out of 173 countries, in 1992. the Human Development Index of the United 
Nations Development Program ranked Benin as number 156 Given the poverty of the population, 
access to financial services is severely constrained. The economy remains in general 
underdeveloped, and Benin experienced great economic difficulties in the late 1980s associated with 
an overvalued currency, weak primary commodity prices, and mismanagement of public finances. 
A limited physical and institutional infrastructure has constrained economic opportunities, while 
macroeconomic instability has added risks to the uncertainties of economic life in general in this 
environment. 
In many respects, economic performance in Benin is strongly linked to that of its powerful 
neighbor, i.e., to Nigeria's oil booms and slumps. Trade and migration across the border are 
important sources of income in Benin. Growth in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 2.4 
percent a year in the 1980-92 period, according to World Bank estimates. Under a structural 
adjustment program started in 1991, Benin increased its growth in real GDP to 4 percent per year 
over the 1990-94 period, and even reached 6 percent real GDP growth in 1995. GDP increases were 
offset by a high annual rate of population growth of 3 percent (World Bank data). 
Inflation remained low at an average of 1.9 percent during the period 1990-93, rose to 38.5 
percent in 1994 following the devaluation of the currency that year, but subsided gradually in 1995 
and was below 5 percent in 1996 (IMF statistics). 
The economy of Benin was once highly dependent on subsistence agriculture and on cotton 
production. In recent years, however, the share of the agricultural sector in Benin's economy has 
been falling. Value added in agriculture accounted for 37 percent of GDP, while agriculture 
employed about 40 percent of the active labor force (Table 1 ). The industrial sector contributes about 
8 percent of GDP, and it employs 14 percent of the active labor force. Services contribute the most 
to GDP (54 percent) while employing 38 percent of the active labor force. 
The dominance of the service sector reflects Benin's role as a channel for the region's foreign 
trade, and it especially reflects the importance of transit trade and transport activities with 
neighboring costal countries such as Nigeria and Togo as well as with landlocked countries such as 
Burkina Faso. Commerce with Nigeria alone provides a quarter of GDP, and it is extremely 
vulnerable to developments in Nigeria, as was the case when re-export trade decreased in 1994 due 
to a severe contraction in demand from Nigeria. A comparison of the contributions of each sector 
to output and to employment suggests that the productivity of labor is higher in some of the service 
sectors than in agriculture and manufacturing. A substantial share of microentrepreneurial activity 
takes place in trade and other service activities. 
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Table 1: Sectoral Composition of GDP in Benin (at current prices), 1986-91. 
1986 1991 
Sectors Value Share in Value Share in 
(billion CF AF) GDP(%) (billion CF AF) GDP(%) 
1. Agriculture 200.2 39.8 199.0 37.2 
2. Industry 28.3 5.6 45.1 8.4 
3. Services 274.2 54.6 291.2 54.4 
Water and electricity 4.3 0.9 5.0 0.9 
Construction 24.6 4.9 17.6 3.3 
Commerce and hotels 96.6 19.2 89.3 16.7 
Transportation and 
communications 48.l 9.6 40.3 7.5 
Public administration 39.3 7.8 50.6 9.4 
Banking and insurance 34.5 6.9 64.0 12.0 
Taxes 26.8 5.3 24.4 4.6 
Total GDP 502.8 100.0 535.5 100.0 
Source: EIU country profile and data from Benin, Ministere du Plan, de la Statistique et de !'analyse 
Economique. 
c. Financial Markets 
The role of microfmance and the efforts of apex organizations that are attempting to promote 
the development of the sector must be understood in the context of the rudimentary and fragmented 
fmancial markets of Benin. 
1. Financial Deepening 
Benin is member of the Franc Zone and of the Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest 
Africaine (UEMOA), which includes seven francophone countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The Union was created in 1962 with a common Central Bank, 
Banque Centrale des Etats de l 'Afrique de l 'Ouest (BCEAO), located in Dakar, Senegal, and 
national branches in member states. All members of UEMOA use the CF A Franc (CF AF) as their 
currency. The CF AF has been pegged to the French Franc at FF 1 = 100 CF AF after the devaluation 
of the currency in January of 1994. Exchange controls apply to all currencies other than the CFA 
Franc and French Franc. Monetary policy, currency, and trading regulations in Benin are controlled 
and determined by the country's membership in the Franc Zone. Recently, this common regulatory 
framework has been extended to microfinance through the P ACMEC Law. 
An important indicator of the growing complexity of an economy is the degree of financial 
sophistication and the range of financial market instruments available. In a global sense, this is 
commonly measured by examining the growth of money aggregates in real terms and the ratio of 
money to GDP, the velocity of money, and the relationship between currency and deposits. 
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Table 2: Financial Indicators of Benin (billion CFAF and Eercentases}, 1990-996. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Demand Deposits 58.5 67.4 72.9 84.6 106.3 107.8 114.8 
Time deposits 29.5 31.7 47.9 59.3 66.l 86.0 90.5 
Total bank liabilities 88.0 99.1 120.8 143.9 172.4 193.8 205.3 
Demand deposits/Total 
Liabilities (%) 66.5 68.0 60.3 58.8 61.7 55.6 55.9 
Time Deposits/Total 
Liabilities (%) 33.5 32.0 39.7 41.2 38.3 44.4 44.1 
Claims on the private sector 102.1 86.2 69.4 67.7 75.0 80.4 102.4 
Total bank Assets 116.0 118.9 140.6 . 125.2 256.9 263.7 284.1 
Claims on private sector/Total 
assets(%) 88.0 72.5 49.5 54.1 29.2 30.5 36.0 
Deposit interest rate 7.0 7.0 7.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Lending interest rate 16.0 16.0 16.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Gross financial margin 9.0 9.0 9.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Annual inflation rate n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 38.5 14.5 4.8 
Source: IMF Statistics. 
Table 3: Financial DeeEenins Measures for Benin (billion CFAF and Eercentases}. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Money (Ml) 104.6 116.7 128.2 111.3 186.2 161.7 189.6 
Ml growth (%) 23.9 11.6 9.9 -13.2 67.3 -13.2 17.3 
Quasi-money 29.5 31.7 47.9 59.3 66.1 86.0 90.5 
Money plus quasi-money 134.1 148.4 176.1 170.6 252.3 247.7 280.l 
(M2) 
M2 growth(%) 28.6 10.7 18.7 -3.l 47.9 -1.8 13.1 
Gross Domestic Product 502.2 535.8 570.8 601.7 845.6 1,056.6 1,162.1 
(GDP) 
Quasi-money/GDP (%) 5.9 5.9 8.4 9.9 7.8 8.1 7.8 
M2/GDP (%) 26.7 27.7 30.9 28.4 29.8 23.4 24.1 
Source: IMF Statistics. 
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The relevant data for Benin for the 1990-1996 period are reported in Tables 2 and 3. The 
data reveal a low degree of financial deepening, as reflected by ratios of M2 to GDP below 30 
percent. That is, the size of formal financial intermediation is small compared to the size of the 
economy. This is comparable, however, to low degrees to financial progress in other Francophone 
African countries. Moreover, financial deepening declined in recent years, as money holdings failed 
to grow as rapidly as the economy. This may be due, in part, to monetary policy, as a rapid nominal 
expansion of the money supply in 1994, which led to inflationary pressures, was followed by a more 
restrictive monetary policy in 1995 and 1996. Furthermore, most money holdings are for transaction 
purposes, while money plays a minor role as a store of value, as shown by the low and stable ratios 
of quasi-money to GDP. The proportion of time deposits with respect to the total liabilities of the 
banking system increased, however, from 34 percent in 1990 to 44 percent in 1996, even with 
unchanged nominal interest rates on deposits. 
The effects oflimited formal financial intermediation were made even worse by a contraction 
of bank credit to the private sector. Despite the steady increase in deposits at the banks (at least in 
nominal terms), bank credit for the private sector declined (even in nominal terms) from CF AF 102 
billion in 1990 to CFAF 68 billion in 1993, and credit only recovered to the 1990 level until 1996.8 
Claims on the private sector as a proportion of the total assets of the banking system declined from 
88 percent in 1990 to 29 percent by 1994 and had only recovered to 36 percent by 1996, as 
confidence in the banking sector slowly built up again. This suggests, however, a major crowding 
out process, and a retrenchment of bank lending to the private sector. The accompanying loss of 
access to bank credit for many former clients would further complicate the challenge for the 
economy of funding investment and productive activities. 
One reason for the reduction of bank credit outstanding for the private sector could have been 
the write-off of several loans after the failure of the banking system in the late 1980s. Restructuring 
of the banks started in 1990, but it has not been sufficient to promote a significant increase in 
financial deepening in Benin. In summary, Benin faces major challenges in harnessing the 
contributions of the financial system for economic development. Expansion of micro finance faces 
even more formidable obstacles. 
2. The Banking System 
The Government of Benin nationalized the existing banks in 1974, after the president Major 
Mathieu Kerekou declared Marxism-Leninism as the country's official ideology. All banks were 
absorbed into a state-owned single commercial bank, the Banque Commerciale du Benin. Two other 
8 Benin experienced a contraction of its money supply in 1993 due to a reduction in the 
government's borrowing from the banking sector coupled with the effect of restrictions on 
CFA Franc notes. In August 1993, as a measure to curtail capital flight, the Franc Zone 
countries placed restrictions on the export of CF A Franc notes outside the Zone. The 
authorities announced that they would no longer repurchase CF A Franc notes that had left 
the Zone through other than recognized banking channels. 
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financial institutions, the Banque Beninoise pour le Developpement and the Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole (CNCA), were set up to disburse long-term and agricultural loans. By the end of 
1988, all three organizations had severe liquidity and management problems. In 1990, a complete 
restructuring of the banking system took place shortly after the country abandoned its Marxist-
Leninist ideology. 
The restructuring of the state-owned banking sector in 1990 gave rise to a formal financial 
sector of five private commercial banks. These banks are: Banque Internationale du Benin (owned 
by a syndicate of four Nigerian banks), Financial Bank (Lebanese and Swiss-owned), Ecobank, Bank 
of Africa, and Continental Bank. They all operate in major urban areas and have limited or no 
branches in rural areas. The National Savings Bank and Postal Checking Service have wider 
geographical outreach but limited deposit and loan services. Access to bank loans is restricted to a 
small number of large, established firms, mostly in commerce. 
3. The Micro finance World in Benin 
Microfinance in Benin remains the domain of credit unions, specific programs and projects 
from international donors, and non-government organizations (NGOs). The informal financial sector 
is dominated by tontines (ROSCAs), and individual moneykeepers and moneylenders with 
operations throughout the country. 
The large number of credit unions that dominate the semi-formal system and microfinance 
in general in Benin are the result of a rehabilitation program started in 1990, after the collapse of the 
banking sector and of the CNCA. To restore the savings and loans system to its original mutualist 
principles, the government withdrew from the management of the cooperatives and replaced the old 
dirigiste system with credit unions or caisses locales de credit agricole mutuel (CLCAM). By 
December 1997, over 200,000 people were members of a credit union network associated with 
FECECAM (Federation des Caisses d'Epargrze et de Credit Mutuel) and 82 CLCAMs operated all 
over the country.9 
Another player in the microfinance world are the array of programs and projects of 
international donors aimed at providing financial services to microentrepreneurs and at reducing 
poverty in general. These programs include PADME (Programme d'Appui au Developpement des 
Micro Entreprises), a World Bank initiative that is part of the structural adjustment package, and 
programs by AFRICARE, an American NGO. These programs are less formal and more 
heterogeneous than the credit union system, and they tend to reach poorer people. 
The NGO microfinance sector is not large. About 20 local NGOs have been involved in 
providing microfinancial services to small entrepreneurs and the poor in Benin. Fewer than five 
NGOs specialize in microfinance, however, from this perspective, any apex mechanism would face 
9 See Chapter IV for a full discussion of FECECAM. 
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a very thin market in Benin. This poses serious challenges from limited opportunities to dilute fixed 
costs. 
Most NGOs that exist in Benin today were created as a result of the economic liberalization 
and openness policies adopted in 1990. They have been mainly involved in agricultural production, 
literacy, health, nutrition, food security, law, and credit and savings services. Thus, most of the 
NGOs that provide microfinancial services do it as a secondary activity and lack the capacity as well 
as the expertise to efficiently deliver financial services. This raises formidable problems for any 
apex organization which attempted to operate on the basis of existing NGOs and it raises questions 
about the best way to promote the expansion of microfinance in Benin. 
D. Concluding Comments 
This introductory chapter provides a background on Benin which shows a country that is 
among the poorest in the world, with very limited outreach by the commercial banking system, and 
with slowly renewed confidence in the financial system after an earlier collapse. Demands for 
financial services by poor household-firms are not, however, satisfied by the formal financial system, 
and the banks would not be in a position to penetrate this market niche still for a long time. The 
semi-formal system, in turn, is dominated by credit unions, and it is able to achieve broader and 
deeper outreach and to provide financial services to clienteles that the banking sector would not 
serve. 
Other players in the microfinance world, such as several international projects and programs 
as well as N GOs, are trying to share a market of at least 3 million rural people ( 60 percent of the 
population) and urban microentrepreneurs. Unfortunately, most NGOs show a crucial lack of 
expertise and of capacity to engage in successful financial intermediation. 
It is within this environment that the apex organizations reviewed in the next two chapters 
are engaged in wholesaling funds and institutional strengthening activities at different levels to 
service the microfinance clientele as well as to strengthen the capacity of existing ofNGOs and other 
microfinance organizations to provide sustainable services to this sector. 
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III 
PADME Case Study 
A. History And Evolution 
The Projet d'Appui au Developpement des Micro Entreprises (PADME) is a project 
originally funded by The World Bank to help the Government of Benin with a structural adjustment 
program that resulted in numerous government employees being laid off. 10 The project was aimed 
at mitigating the social costs of structural adjustment and at helping those who were laid off by 
providing financial support to former government employees who wanted to start microenterprise 
activities. The project was launched on September 1st, 1993, and it quickly expanded to include all 
types of microentrepreneurs. 
The P ADME project has gone through three phases: 
(a) The pilot phase lasted for two years, until August 31, 1995. During this phase, PADME was 
managed with technical assistance from VITA, an American NGO. 
(b) The consolidation phase covered the period from September 1995 to June 1996. During this 
phase the project was strengthened and expanded. 
( c) The institutionalization phase started on July 1st, 1996 and was completed on December 31, 
1997. This phase was expected to allow the program to firmly position itself in the 
microfinance world and to transform itself into a private not-for profit organization. 
In effect, P ADME acquired its new status of private voluntary organization on December 23, 
1997, and it took the name Association pour la Promotion et l 'Appui aux Micro Entreprises. This 
step in the right direction will lead the organization into a new phase. 
B. Organizational Structure 
1. Mission 
The principal mission of P ADME has been to contribute to the growth and development of 
the microenterprise sector in Benin by providing financial services to microentrepreneurs in urban 
and peri-urban Cotonou. More specifically, PADME provides: 
(a) 
10 
loans to existing and eligible microenterprises, 
Credit programs created for specific clientele to compensate them from negative impacts of 
policy reforms or for other exogenous events (e.g., army demobilization), which cannot focus 
on the evaluation of creditworthiness, tend to face greater difficulties in enforcing credit 
contracts and tend to experience high arrears rates. 
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(b) loans to local NGOs to be disbursed to their own clientele in rural areas, and 
( c) training and technical assistance to microentrepreneurs and local NGO staff members. 
First, it is worth noting that PADME's mission was initially limited to providing credit in 
Cotonou, where its potential clientele (i.e., laid off public employees) resided. It was not a bad idea, 
however, to expand the program to all urban microentrepreneurs. Established microentrepreneurs 
most likely have more experience and would make a better mix of clientele than former public 
employees newly converted to microentrepreneurs. This would reduce risks for the organization and 
would alleviate political pressures to disburse loans to applicants who are not creditworthy. 
Second, PADME's mission included the provision of technical assistance to micro-
entrepreneurs from the beginning, but not necessarily the provision of technical assistance to other 
microfinance organizations and their staff. The combination of technical assistance and credit, per 
se, already creates complications for any microfinance organization, and it stretches its limited 
managerial resources over a broader range of difficult and often incompatible activities. 
Third, PADME's role as an apex mechanism that relies on NGOs to reach rural clients has 
been definitively an addition to the original mission that further stretches its organizational 
capabilities. The purpose of this case study is to find out how well PADME has handled this more 
complex and difficult mission. 
P ADME is, thus, both a microfinance organization that is engaged in financial activities at 
the first-tier as well as an apex organization that operates at the second-tier level. In general, the 
simultaneous operation of wholesaling and retailing activities creates major tensions for an apex 
organization. The potential conflicts between the apex and its clients are in part resolved for 
PADME by a division of labor that reserves the urban clientele for the first-tier operation of the 
organization and that leaves the rural clientele for the partner NGOs alone. Moreover, P ADME 
started at the retailing level and only took its apex functions when the retailing activities were 
already operational. 
Urban and peri-urban microentrepreneurs and local NGOs thus constitute PADME's 
principal clients. P ADME does not offer any deposit services, and its loans are not targeted to any 
particular gender. Direct loans to microentrepreneurs, i.e., PADME's first-tier financial activities, 
are restricted to the towns of Cotonou and Porto-Novo. The organization's main office is located 
in Cotonou. There is a branch in Porto-Novo, while two other branches are scheduled to open later 
in the towns ofBohicon and Parakou. Loans to local NGOs constitute PADME's second-tier, apex 
activities. These funds are aimed at the rural population. 
2. Ownership and Governance Structure 
PADME was funded by The World Bank through a loan to the Government of Benin. Up 
to December 1997, P ADME was a public entity under the direct supervision of the Ministry of 
Planning of Benin. P ADME was then a component of a larger government program set up to 
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provide support to all enterprises in Benin called the Projet d'Assistance aux Entreprises (PAE) 
under the Ministry of Planning, Economic Restructuring, and Employment. A coordinator from the 
PAE and the Ministry of Planning oversaw PADME's activities. The project remained otherwise 
free of any government interference in hiring its personnel and carrying out its stated mission. 
In general, government ownership, however, introduces serious threats of political intrusion 
that may jeopardize the achievement of sustainability. Transformation into a private voluntary 
organization was in part motivated by a desire to reduce this dependence. Since becoming a non-
government organization, P ADME has attempted to reorganize under a new structure to take case 
of the absence of well-defined owners which can create a threat of inadequate internal control for 
the organization. Although the transformation into an NGO takes away much of the threat of 
political intrusion, ownership rights are still attenuated and insufficient internal control may threaten 
its long-term sustainability. 
P ADME, as an association, is run by a General Assembly that includes microentrepreneurs, 
staff members, financial and other partner organizations, and the Government of Benin. The General 
Assembly is the supreme governing structure of the association, and it appoints the members of the 
Executive Committee. The General Manager is responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
association, and the supervision of the staff from four departments: credit, administration and 
finance, computing, and internal auditing (see organizational chart). 
3. Management and Staff 
PADME started with five employees in December of 1993. For the first two years, it 
benefited from the technical assistance of VITA, an American NGO, until August 1995, when the 
program was handed over to a Beninese staff. As of December 1997, there were 32 employees at 
PADME, including a Managing Director, an Assistant Manager in charge of the credit division, a 
Financial Manager in charge of the financial and administrative unit, a computer specialist in charge 
of the computing department, and an internal auditor responsible for the audit unit. See Figure 1 for 
the organization chart. 
An incentive structure has been introduced at P ADME to encourage efforts in screening, and 
monitoring clients and in enforcing loan contracts. Thus, loan officers (13 in total) responsible for 
reviewing the clients' loan applications, and approving and monitoring the loan up to repayment, 
receive a yearly bonus equal to 5 percent of the total loans granted and recovered by the agent. 
Basing the yearly bonus on loan recovery introduces incentives compatible with the growth and 
sustainability of the organization. In the future, P ADME plans to tie the bonus with efforts made 
toward loan diversification as well. 
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C. Policies And Operations at the First-Tier Level 
1. Selection Criteria 
The criteria for microentrepreneurs to be eligible for a loan from PADME (target group) are 
the following: 
(a) to have a business enterprise that is already in operation, 
(b) that the enterprise be located in the urban or peri-urban area where PADME operates, and 
( c) to be a citizen of Benin. 
Most microenterprises that meet these criteria hire two to four employees and are involved 
in artisanal activities such as tailoring, wood and metal work, sale of food products, and other trading 
activities. A few of PADME's clients have more than 10 employees. The selection criteria did not 
purposely include a size limit for the microenterprise because this is not a good criterion to define 
microenterprises in Benin. P ADME considered instead a broader definition based on financial 
requirements: to be considered a microenterprise and thus be eligible for P ADME loans, any 
enterprise's financing needs should not exceed CF AF 2 million (US$ 4,000), the largest loan amount 
possible under the program. It is almost impossible for an enterprise with these characteristics to 
have access to bank loans in Benin. 
2. Loan Processing 
Upon reception of a loan application, a credit officer from P ADME makes a field visit to 
verify all information related to the potential borrower and its business activities. Afterwards, a 
credit committee reviews the application for approval. 
Before the loan is granted, any approved borrower must attend a workshop on 
microenterprise management. The session, which lasts approximately four hours, includes elements 
of business marketing, accounting, and loan management. The terms and conditions of PADME's 
loan contract are also explained at the meeting. Entrepreneurs are asked to keep a book of all 
expenses and revenues related to their business and to keep them separate from the household's 
account. Entrepreneurs are, for example, advised to pay themselves a salary that will be used for 
household expenses instead of using the proceeds from the business for this purpose. 
P ADME believes that the workshop has to be attended every time the entrepreneur receives 
a loan, because the meeting's recommendations help the microentrepreneur avoid management 
mistakes capable of bankrupting the business. Thus, the aim of the workshop is to alleviate failure 
risks among microentrepreneurs by providing them with useful information and advice about their 
business and by having former borrowers tell their success stories to new clients. The workshop 
starts with testimonies from other entrepreneurs on how their business benefited from the advice 
given upon receiving their former loans. The agenda also includes several other topics. First, the 
realities of the business enterprise focusses on the need for the entrepreneur to identify a business 
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that offers goods and services that are in demand. Second, the fundamental elements of a good 
management discusses marketing, and good accounting. It discusses ways for entrepreneurs to 
market their products more effectively by improving their appearance, the packaging, where they are 
sold, how, where, when, and the power of advertisement. Accounting insists on minimum 
bookkeeping and separation of the business from household accounts. Third, loan management 
reviews the terms of contract of the borrower with PADME. Fourth, loan monitoring is also 
discussed and warns potential borrowers on follow up by P ADME of their activities and use of the 
advices provided by the workshop to ensure good repayment of the loan. For PADME, the 
workshop is an important element of its risk management strategy. However, entrepreneurs have 
complained about the fact that they are subjected to the workshop every single time they borrow 
money and they do not feel that this is necessary. In fact with an increase in the number of 
borrowers, P ADME would find it increasingly difficult to accommodate everyone on its premises 
for the course. 
The number of participants at the workshops has been steadily increasing over the years as 
the number of individual borrowers also has grown. From 32 sessions attended by 445 participants 
in 1994, PADME was offering 242 sessions with 7,186 participants in September of 1997. At the 
time of the study, sessions were offered twice a week, i.e., every Tuesday and Friday when loans 
were being granted. 
3. Loan Granting, Contract Design, and Contract Enforcement 
Loans are granted for a maximum term of one year (12 months), and repayments are due 
monthly, with a grace period of at most two months when asked. The maximum loan amount is 
CF AF 2 million (US $ 4,000), while the minimum is CF AF 20,000 (US $ 40). The interest rate is 
2 percent per month on a declining balance, yielding an annual nominal rate of 13.5 percent. In 
1996, the annual effective interest rate on loans was 2 percent. Collateral is always required and it 
varies from physical assets (land, equipment), habitat permit, cosigner, to a group liability. 
P ADME does not offer any deposit services except for the 10 percent forced savings required 
of every borrower and used as a guarantee fund. Those who cannot provide sufficient guaranty are 
required to deposit an additional 10 percent of the loan amount. Loan applications include a fee of 
1 percent of the loan amount. Delinquent loans carry a penalty of 2 percent of the late amount in 
addition to a CF AF 3,000 (US $ 6) fee for each late payment. Loan disbursements take place twice 
a week, every Tuesday and Friday, and repayments take place whenever due. All loan operations 
(disbursement and repayments) are handled by Financial Bank, PADME's long time commercial 
bank partner. 
The partnership of P ADME with Financial Bank deserves more attention, as linkages to a 
formal financial institution may in general represent an alternative to apex organizations. From the 
very beginning, Financial Bank has been willing to provide P ADME with special windows at the 
bank. The operations of P ADME customers at Financial Bank represent one-third of all the Bank's 
cash transactions. Why has Financial Bank agree to such a partnership? Managers at the bank tell 
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us that the partnership is part of the bank's social agenda, which includes involvement microfinance. 
In effect, to fulfill its social agenda, Financial Bank has been using its own resources to make 
mortgage loans to private sector employees through their unions. The bank has also financed some 
agricultural equipment loans. 
The partnership with P ADME allows the bank to get familiar with microentrepreneurs who 
are potential clients, whom it hopes it will graduate to its bank operations. The bank is thus engaged 
in a downscaling exercise that minimizes its costs. There is only one agent assigned to the P ADME 
window at the bank, although more windows will be created soon to accommodate the increasing 
number of PADME's clients. All loan application reviews, loan granting, and monitoring are 
implemented by PADME's credit officers. They do not involve any staff from Financial Bank. 
There is, however, a manager at the bank in charge of relations with P ADME, who oversees all the 
operations, registers all the complains about the quality of services, and takes the necessary steps to 
make the adjustments required. 
For P ADME, Financial Bank allows the program to also eliminate some costs involved with 
setting up a bank including buying and protecting the safes, hiring bank tellers, and incurring the 
added administrative costs. Allowing the borrowers to use Financial bank facilities for their 
operations is also reassuring for PADME's clients. In fact, it could be an additional blessing when 
PADME starts mobilizing deposits, as potential savers would be concerned with the safety of their 
money. It would be interesting to see PADME and Financial Bank develop their relationship a bit 
more and to what extent each party benefits from what the other has to offer. Financial Bank should 
help P ADME minimize the costs of mobilizing deposits as this appear to be the biggest next 
challenge for the organization. 
Loan Monitoring 
Loan monitoring are enforced by P ADME loan officers who are assigned specific zones and 
clients. Loan monitoring entails regular visits to the borrower's place of business, keeping abreast 
of the level of activity for which the loan was granted and collecting additional information by 
talking to friends and neighbors. The loan officer also checks the books that entrepreneurs are 
supposed to maintain to facilitate their business management. P ADME believes that "a business 
without any accounting is like a car driving in the dark without any lights". Teaching 
microentrepreneurs to keep written records is a way for P ADME to help them move from the 
informal to the formal world, says management. 
3. Auditing, MIS and Accounting Systems 
The management information system (MIS) at P ADME was developed with the assistance 
of VITA and is fully computerized. Key reports generated by the MIS are produced at the 
headquarter in Cotonou. Internal and external accounting are provided by the technical staff at 
P ADME and outside auditors. At the time of the field visit, P ADME was in the process of updating 
its computer software to better handle its loan operations. In fact, P ADME had outgrown the 
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management package inherited from VITA which no longer responded to the needs of the 
organization and the nature of the operations being undertaken. 
D. Policies and Operations at the Second-tier Level 
1. P ADME and AFRICARE 
AFRICARE is a private, not-for profit American organization with headquarters in 
Washington D.C. AFRICARE was created in 1971 and assists families and communities throughout 
Africa. During its first years, AFRICARE concentrated on helping to alleviate the effects of severe 
drought in West Africa. By the mid-1970s, Africare had shifted its emphasis to development 
programs in the areas of agriculture, water, environmental protection and health. Today, Africare 
works in 28 African countries and maintain offices in 25 countries including Benin. 
The mission of Africare-Benin was to help indigenous non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to develop more effective, accountable and participatory structures. Africare started its 
operations in Benin in 1993 and in May 1994, it signed an accord with USAID that granted the 
organization US$ 4.6 million to launch Benin Indigenous NGO Strengthening (BINGOS) program. 
The purpose of BINGOS was to strengthen the capacity of Beninese local NGOs so they can be 
effective development tools. BINGOS had several components: 
• Institutional Support Grants to help NGOs improve their operations and become more 
professional. Grant money can be used for credit activities, as well as to buy equipment, and 
pay employees salaries or any other operational expense. 
• Micro-Projects Grants allowed NGOs to finance their regular activities and become more 
proficient at them. 
• Umbrella Grants were reserved for American NGOs to help them reinforce their ties with 
local Beninese NGOs. The first grant was given to VITA (Volunteers in Technical 
Assistance) and allowed PADME11 to start its apex activities of providing technical 
assistance in credit methodology and wholesale loans to local NGOs. 
After receiving its first funds from Africare, P ADME put in place a strategy whereby it would 
provide second-tier loans to local Beninese NGOs who met the criteria that it had defined for its apex 
activities. 
• 
• 
11 
2. Criteria for P ADME Apex loans 
The selection criteria for NGOs to be eligible for a loan and become a P ADME partner are: 
Be legally registered in the country as a local NGO 
Have a microfinance activity 
P ADME was being run by VITA at that time. 
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• Operate in rural areas 
• Be able to offer a reliable guarantee or collateral for the loan 
The criteria for NGOs were not very strict and PADME did not restrict itself to NGOs 
specializing in microfinance. In fact, P ADME did not have the luxury of such a choice as almost 
all NGOs in the country engaged in microfinance as a secondary, complementary activity. 
3. Loan Processing, Granting, and Monitoring 
Loan Processing 
Eligible NGOs submit loan application to P ADME which includes the list of all members 
requesting a loan, the individual loan amounts as well as the total amount requested. Loan 
applications include a fee of 1 percent of the loan amount. A credit officer at P ADME makes a field 
visit to the NGO to verify that the members really exist and also check other relevant information. 
The NGO is the responsible party for the loan repayment to P ADME. NGO final borrowers are not 
required to attend the workshop on microenterprise management after the credit committee approves 
the global loan. However, all NGO staff are given courses on basic loan management, appraisal of 
clients needs, and loan monitoring. Three NGO partners benefited also of an additional course in 
accounting and more advanced loan management techniques. 
NGOs which are granted a loan are required to have an accounting system, and to report to 
P ADME on their loan activities. However, no financial statement, balance sheet or income 
statement is required to be sent to PADME. That is because most NGOs do not have the expertise 
to draw such statements. 
Loan Granting, Contract Design, Contract enforcement 
Apex loans to NGOs do not exceed 18 months. That is six months longer than the maximum 
term for a first-tier loan. Repayments are expected monthly with a grace period of two months. The 
maximum loan amount is CF AF 2 million (US $ 4,000) while the minimum is CF AF 20,000 (US 
$ 40). The interest rate is 1 percent per month on a declining balance so that the NGO can grant loans 
to their members at 2 percent per month, the same rate that applies to PADME's first-tier clients. 
A collateral is always required from the NGO and it may vary from the organization's asset (land, 
equipment), to the personal assets of the NGO board members. Delinquent loans carry a penalty 
of 2 percent of the late amount in addition to a CF AF 3,000 (US $ 6) fee for each late payment. 
Although the loan contract is between P ADME and the NGO, loan officers at P ADME still insist 
on being present during loan disbursement to NGO members. In 1996, the only year P ADME made 
apex loans, the organizations made second-tier loans to seven local NGOs ranging from CFAF 
600,000 (US $ 1,200) to CF AF 3 million (US $ 6,000) for 18 months. 
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Loan Monitoring 
The monitoring of the NGO by PADME loan officers stops after the officer witnesses the 
loan disbursement to the final borrowers. Individual loan monitoring is left to the NGO staff. The 
only other contacts between P ADME and the NGO happens when there is a problem with loan 
repayment. 
By leaving individual loan monitoring of NGO members to the NGO staff, P ADME is 
assuming that the NGO is capable of assuming such a task. P ADME also feels confident that it had 
double-checked the credentials of the final borrowers. The problem comes from the fact that partner 
NGOs have almost no experience in microfinance and loan monitoring except from what P ADME 
taught them in a few courses. P ADME is, thus, taking a big risk by trusting them with loan 
monitoring but the apex does not have the human resources to follow these loans itself. There is, 
thus, areal dilemma in PADME's dealings with NGOs. On the one hand it wants to service more 
rural and poorer people, on the other hand, it is taking a lot of risk to do that. Fortunately for 
P ADME, the loan technology it was using with its partner NGOs worked fairly well and default was 
kept at a minimum. 
E. Performance of P ADME at the First-tier Level 
1. Growth and Expansion 
P ADME experienced a rapid growth from 1994, when it started, to 1997 when it was about 
to achieve its institutionalization process. The number of loans granted increased from 437 in 1994 
to 2817 by September 1997, representing a 545 percent growth. The amount of loan granted 
registered a similar growth over the same three-year period (Table 1 ). The organization has also 
opened a second office in Cotonou and expanded its first-tier operations to the town of Porto-Novo. 
In the near future, P ADME plans to extend its activities to Bohicon and Parakou, two other major 
towns in Benin. 
2. Outreach 
Breadth of Outreach 
By the end of September 1997, PADME had granted 7145 loans to 4,599 clients. The total 
loan amount was CFAF 2,8 billion (US$ 5,6 million) (see Table 1). PADME increased its loan 
granting capacity nearly 4 times from 429 loans in 1994 to 1547 loans by September 1997. The 
number of repeat borrowers represented 82 percent of all new loans granted in 1997 (Table 1 ). 
P ADME approved 93 percent of all loan applications in 1997 of which 12 percent where group loans 
to 998 women borrowers. Each group comprises three women microentrepreneurs who know each 
other well. In total 75 percent of PADME's clients were women. With its direct loan activities, 
P ADME estimates that it is reaching 3 percent of the microenterprise clientele of 71,000 in Cotonou 
and 24,000 in Porto-Novo, in places where it had virtually no competition. This rather limited 
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outreach makes one assume that there is a very large demand for microenterprise loans that is still 
unmet at this time. 
Depth of Outreach 
The average loan amount for direct loans to microentrepreneurs in Cotonou was CF AF 
360,000 (US$ 720) for first time borrowers and CF AF 700,000 (US$ 1,400) for repeat borrowers. 
In Porto-Novo, it was CFAF 250,000 (US$ 500) and CFAF 400,000 (US$ 800) respectively. In 
general, a second loan cannot be more than double the first loan. The average loan term was 10 
months. Obviously, PADME loans were not being granted to the poorest of the poor. Borrowers 
were microentrepreneurs living in urban areas, and who had higher financial needs than the typical 
rural artisan. 
Quality of Services Provided 
Most microentrepreneurs who are PADME's clients cannot access commercial bank loans 
and interviews with borrowers revealed that they highly value P ADME loans. Close to half 
PADME's clients were repeat borrowers in 1997 and only 2 percent of borrowers left the program 
since its inception in 1994. However, borrowers expressed the wish to have access to larger size 
loans in the future. There is good reason to believe that the loyalty showed by P ADME' s clients so 
far would also translate in their willingness to save with the organization if it were to engage in 
deposits mobilization. 
Repayment Performance 
P ADME had a total loan outstanding amount of CF AF 651.5 million (US$ 1.3 million) in 
1996 of which less than 1 percent (FCFA 5.1 million. i.e., US$ 10,200) was in arrears. By 
September 1997, repayment at PADME stood at 99 percent. This high repayment rate can be 
explained by the thorough analysis done by P ADME before granting a loan, and the sustained 
monitoring that takes place during the life of the loan. 
F. Performance of P ADME at the Second-tier Level 
1. Outreach 
Apex loans that were granted to seven local NGOs are believed to have reached more than 
500 microentrepreneurs in rural areas. The total amount received from Africare in 1995 and granted 
to NGOs was CFAF 19.7 million (US$ 39,400) from Africare BINGOS program. USAID/Africare 
funding to P ADME was made possible while the project was being run by VITA but the funding and 
consequently the apex activities were put on hold after VITA turned the project over to local 
ownership and the government of Benin. Apex loans ranged from a minimum of CF AF 600,000 
(US$1200) to a maximum of CF AF 3 million (US$ 6,000). The average apex loan was CF AF 1, 7 
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million (US$ 3,400), carried a 1 percent monthly interest rate, and was granted for a maximum of 
18 months. The average NGO membership was 150 people most of them women. 
Apex loans to local NGOs have undoubtedly reached more of the poorest in Benin who are 
the bulk of the rural population including women. In fact, most partner NGOs had at least 90 percent 
of their clients who were women. A field visit to SURVIE, one of PADME's partner revealed that 
the NGO was created in 1989 and focused on women's health and nutrition, family planning, water 
and sanitation, democracy and women's rights in additions to microfmance. SURVIE's started its 
microfinance activities in 199412 in the Zou region where its headquarters are located. In 1996, 
SURVIE received a loan amount of CF AF 3 million (US$ 6,000) from P ADME for 12 months to 
which the NGO added CFAF 1 million (US$ 2,000) of its own funds to grant CFAF 100,000 (US$ 
200) to 40 groups of five women each. In total 200 women received each CFAF 20,000 (US$ 40)13 
for 10 months at 15 percent annual interest rate. The repayment rate was 100 percent. Among the 
20 staff members at SURVIE, only one person had any real competency in microfinance. Thus, 
P ADME had to provide some training to eight staff members responsible for loan monitoring. The 
NGO also participated in the course offered by CGAP in Cotonou in September 1997 on loan 
delinquency and interest rate setting and was part of the BINGOS program. 
Apex clients of PADME, i.e., NGOs highly value the training and technical assistance 
provided by P ADME. That allows them to reinforce the capacity they admit they lack. 
Apex loan recovery was 95 percent as of December 1997 with a defaulting NGO that has 
repaid only 51 percent of its loan amount. 
2. Sustainability 
Operational Self-Sufficiency 
The most basic indicator of operational efficiency examines the organization's operating 
costs as a percentage of its average loan portfolio. This ratio reveals how much it costs the 
organization to lend one CF AF. High ratios suggest administrative inefficiency, small loan portfolio 
or a combination of both. In the case of P ADME, operational expenses were not very high, averaging 
32 percent from 1994 to 1997 (Table 2). They have, in fact, been decreasing over the years, and in 
1996, CFAF 0.326 was spent for every CFAF 1 earned. Operaring costs as a percent of average loan 
portfolio were even lower in 1997 with a ratio of 26.5 percent, a sign of a rather efficient operation 
atPADME. 
12 
13 
SURVIE started its microfinance activities in 1994 after receiving funding from Catholic 
Relief Service (CRS), an American NGO, for a village banking program. 
That represented 9.6 percent of GDP per capita of US$ 418. 
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The measures for PADME's operational self-sufficiency are also found in Table 2. The 
ratios showed an average of 152 percent over the four-year period indicating that P ADME was able 
to more than adequately cover its operational costs by its overall revenues. For every CFAF 1 of 
expenses in 1997, PADME generated CFAF 1.4 in income. 
Aggregate profitability is typically measured in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE). The higher the return, the better. After experiencing an increase from 1994 to 
1995, both ratios decreased from 1995 to 1996 but were in the rise again in 1997 and settled at 9.2 
percent for ROA and ROE was 10.7 percent in 1997 (Table 2). These ratios indicate net income of 
CF AF 0.09 per CF AF 1 of assets owned during the year 1997 and net income of CF AF 0.11 per 
CF AF 1 of equity owned during the period which are rather low. 
Financial Self-Sufficiency and SDI Measures for P ADME 
The performance and sustainability of a microfinance organization such as P ADME depends 
on its financial self-sufficiency, i.e., its ability to generate sufficient income not only to cover the 
operational costs of the organization but the financial costs as well. Performing a cost-structure 
analysis is the most comprehensive approach to analyzing the financial performance of an 
organization and involves the calculation of the net operating margin. Every year, the net operating 
margin for P ADME remained positive although decreasing and was 4.1 percent in 1997 (Table 2). 
A positive net operating margin reveals that P ADME is covering actual costs with income derived 
from its loan operations. P ADME is, nonetheless, a highly subsided organization whose operating 
and loan funds are grant money from international donors. 
To find out just how dependent PADME is on outside funds, it is useful to calculate the 
Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI). The objective of the SDI is to provide a comprehensive method 
of assessing and measuring the overall financial costs involved in operating a microfinance 
organization (MFO) and quantifying its subsidy dependence. The SDI is a ratio that measures the 
percentage increase in the average on-lending interest rate required to compensate an MFO for the 
elimination of subsidies in a given year while keeping its return on equity equal to the approximate 
non concessional borrowing cost. The index assumes, for simplicity, that an increase in the on-
lending interest rate is the only change made to compensate for loss of subsidy. An SDI of zero 
assumes that a MFO achieved full self-sustainability. An SDI of 100 percent indicates that a 
doubling of the average on-lending interest rate is required if subsidies are to be eliminated. 
Similarly, an SDI of200 percent indicates that a threefold increase in the on-lending interest rate is 
required to compensate for the subsidy elimination. (Gurgand, Pederson, and Yaron, 1994). 
The available information from the published financial statements over a four-year period 
allow us to calculate only two SDI, i.e., for the years 1995 to 1997. The SDI has shown a decrease 
from 1996 to 1997 and the latest figure obtained indicates that in 1997, an increase of 27.4 percent 
in the on-lending interest rate or a 7 percentage points increase14 would be required to eliminate the 
14 24*0.274 = 7 
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subsidy received by PADME (see Annex). That is, PADME would have to increase their interest 
rate on loans from 24 percent to 30 percent to eliminate all subsidies. That is quite a reasonable goal 
which in addition will let P ADME still comply with the P ARMEC law regulation. 
G. Challenges and Potential for PADME 
1. Problems Faced and Lessons Learned 
Among the problems P ADME was confronted with on a daily basis are: the lack of capacity 
among NGOs, the high illiteracy rate among the targeted population, a difficult legal environment 
for contract enforcement, the absence of statistics on the size ofmicroenterprise sector. For its first-
tier activities, the organization intents to diversify its portfolio away from trading activities which 
comprises 80 percent of the actual loan portfolio. 
P ADME has also learned a few lessons from its short-lived apex experience with NGOs. The 
organization has developed a better and stricter selection criteria for its future apex operations. Thus, 
P ADME intends to ask NGOs for more reliable collateral, and to increase the loan term beyond the 
now 18 months period. 
2. Role and Challenges for P ADME 
P ADME's growth has been impressive since its creation and the organization has built a solid 
reputation as a viable microfinance organization. PADME's future as a microfinance retail 
organization seems bright given its high repayment rate. The organization has also already achieved 
operational sustainability although it is still dependent on donor subsidies. In order to fulfill its wish 
of expanding its operations to the rest of the country, PADME estimates that it will need continued 
donor support. If some funds can be accumulated from deposits mobilization, all the additional 
funds would not have to come from donors alone. However, mobilizing savings is a very costly 
venture and may not be very profitable under the new P ARMEC law which places limits on interest 
rates. That issue needs to be examined further. In any case, PADME's ability to leverage funds from 
outside may be helped by its remarkable performance thus far, and its change of status into a private 
organization. 
As an apex organization, P ADME' s experience is limited and has been short-lived due to the 
lack of donor funds and its status as a public entity at the time. It has played only a limited role in 
institution building of partner NGOs. It played no role as a supervisor and or regulator of other 
MFOs and NGOs except for a monitoring role over partner NGOs. Thus, PADME's success as an 
apex organization is difficult to assess given its limitation in time and scale. The contribution to the 
development of sustainable capacity at the retail level has been very minimum. First, P ADME was 
not equipped to deal with institution building at a grand scale, and second, it did not interact enough 
with the NGOs to make any difference. 
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The biggest challenge for P ADME remains its ability to undertake more apex activities in 
the future. The biggest constraint will be the limited availability of human capital which is rightfully 
concentrated at the first-tier level where it is most profitable to the microfinance industry in Benin. 
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Table 1: Loan Granting at P ADME over the Years 
1994 1995 1996 1997* Total 
Number of new loans 429 1,070 1,553 1,547 4,599 
Number of repeat loans 8 304 964 1,270 2,546 
Total number of loans granted 437 1,374 2,517 2,817 7,145 
Total amount of loan disbursed in 178,132,500 544,620,000 934,920,000 1,142,950,000 2,800,622,500 
CFAF 
Source: PADME Report 
* As of September 31, 1997 
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Table2. Measuring PADME's Operational Efficiency 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Financial expenses (CF AF) 0 0 0 0 
Operating Expenses (CFAF)1 31,570,595 51,858,825 148,341,630 221,786,302 
Total Expenses (CFAF) 31,570,595 51,858,825 148,341,630 224,458, 129 
Financial income 2 41,056,358 112,302,675 175,181,921 265,783,875 
Operating income 41,056,358 112,302,675 184,364,550 302,285, 768 
Total Income (CFAF) 46,607,607 118,710,796 202,391, 138 320,547,351 
Net Income (CFAF) 15,037,012 66,851,971 54,049,508 96,089,222 
Financial Assets 160,376,854 396,061,386 751,695,511 1,233,886, 191 
Avg.Total Assets 87,197,928 298,943,617 606,954,394 1,044,945, 180 
Avg. Total Equity 84,348,007 273,722,581 531,053,848 898,816,492 
Total Liabilities 5,699,842 44,742,230 103,058,862 185, 198,514 
Avg. Outstanding portfolio (CFAF) 68,090,936 242,806,987 454,393,007 838,502,652 
Operating Expenses/ 46.4% 21.4% 32.6% 26.5% 
Avg. Outstanding Portfolio 
Operational Self-sufficiency3 130.0% 216.6% 124.3% 136.3% 
ROA4 17.2% 22.4% 8.9% 9.2% 
ROE5 17.8% 24.4% 10.2% 10.7% 
Gross Financial Margin6 47.1% 37.6% 28.9% 25.4% 
Net Operating margin7 10.9% 20.2% 4.4% 4.2% 
Source: PADME report 
Notes: 1 : Operating expenses are equal to personnel expenses, administrative expenses, including 
2. 
3 • 
4 • 
5 • 
6 • 
7 
depreciation of fixed assets. They do not include financial costs and loan loss provisions. 
Financial income = income from interest and loan fees 
Operational self-sufficiency =Financial income /Financial + Operating Costs +Loan 
loss provision 
ROA = Net income/Avg. Total assets 
ROE = Net income/Avg. Total equity 
Gross Financial Margin = (Financial income - Financial Costs) I Avg. Total assets 
Net Operating Margin = Gross Financial margin - Operating costs I Avg. Total Assets 
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ANNEX 1. Consolidated Balance Sheet Data for PADME, 1994-97 (CFAF) 
12-31-94 12-31-95 12-31-96 12-31-97 
ASSETS 
Cash & due from banks 21,796,542 44,054,404 172,542, 762 5,359,099 
Loans 136,181,871 349,432,103 559,353,910 1,117,651,393 
Performing assets 157,978,413 393,486,507 731,896,672 1,123,010,492 
Other creditors 2,398,441 2,574,879 3,324,622 38,999,863 
Misc. Receivables 0 0 16,474,217 71,875,836 
Fixed Assets (Building and Equipment) 14,019,001 27,429,993 38,721,897 65,586,760 
Other Assets 16,417,442 30,004,872 58,520,736 176,462,459 
TOTAL ASSETS 174~95.855 423.491.379 790.417.408 1.299.472.951 
LIABILITIES & OWNER'S EQUITY 
Accounts payable 0 0 0 0 
Deposits for guarantee fund 5,699,842 43,340,757 90,004,423 168,458,661 
Other liabilities 0 1,401,473 13,054,439 16,739,853 
Total Liabilities 5,699,842 44,742,230 103,058,862 185,198,514 
Advances on loan subsidy fund 140,000,000 270,295,773 509,563,773 822,749,773 
Investment Subsidy fund 13,659,001 26,564,393 37,856,282 59,496,951 
Retained Earnings 0 15,037,012 81,888,983 135,938,491 
Year-end Net Income 15,037,012 66,851,971 54,049,508 96,089,222 
Total Equity 168,696,013 378,749,149 683,358,546 1,114,274,437 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & OWNER'S 
EQUITY 174.325.855 42J.421.379 786.417.408 1.299.472.951 
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ANNEX 2. Consolidated Income Statement for PADME, 1994-97 (CFAF) 
12-31-94 12-31-95 12-31-96 12-31-97 
INCOME 
Loan Interest Income 8,927,059 49,525,651 94,677,566 204,056, 132 
Other Income1 32,129,299 62,777,024 80,504,355 61,727,743 
Change in depreciation 0 0 9,182,629 7,872,881 
Subsidies 5,551,249 6,408,121 18,026,588 18,261,583 
Misc. income 0 0 0 28,629,012 
TOTAL INCOME 46,607,607 118, 710, 796 202,391,138 320,547 ,351 
EXPENSES 
Interest expenses 0 0 0 2,671,827 
General and administrative expenses 8,057,657 10,427,713 21,583,716 30,338,255 
Other adm. Expenses 4,759,918 3,987,183 8,447,224 16,272,341 
Taxes 24,550 225 111,300 172,250 
Salary Expense 11,437,500 23,592,675 61,771,008 99,931,923 
Maintenance Expense 0 0 16,526,982 35,020,555 
Depreciation 7,290,970 13,851,029 26,043,574 39,298,627 
Misc. Expense 0 0 13,857,826 752,351 
TOTAL EXPENSES 31,570,595 51,858,825 148,341,630 224,458, 129 
NET INCOME 15,037,012 66,851,971 54,049,508 96,089,222 
Note: 1: Other income includes loan application and processing fees, and income on clients' deposits 
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ANNEX 3. Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) 
Computation of the SDI: 
where: 
and: 
SDI= s 
LP* i 
S=A(m -c) +[(E *m)-p] +K 
S = Annual subsidy received by the MFO; 
A = MFO concessional borrowed funds outstanding (annual average); 
m = Interest rate the MFO would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds if access to borrowed 
concessional funds were eliminated; 
c = Weighted average annual concessional rate of interest actually paid by the MFO on its 
average annual concessional borrowed funds outstanding; 
E = Average annual equity; 
P = Reported annual profit (before tax) (adjusted, when necessary, for loan loss 
provisions, inflation, etc.); 
K = The sum of all other annual subsidies received by the MFO (such as partial or complete 
coverage of the MFO' s operational costs by the state); 
LP= Average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the MFO; 
i = Weighted average on-lending interest rate earned on the loan portfolio of the MFO. 
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Table 1. Calculating SDI over the years for PADME' 
Item 
Cncessional borrowing = A2 
Concessional rate of interest paid by MFO = c 
Market lending rate = m 
Annual average equity = E 
Subsidy on equity = (E*m) 
Profits = P (losses) 
Grants and Benefits = K3 
Total subsidy = S 
Revenue from lending4 = LP*i 
SDI 
Source: PADME published financial statements 
Note: 1: All absolute amounts are in CFAF 
2: No concessional borrowing took place 
3: Reported figures in the income statement 
1995 
0 
0.0% 
16.75% 
273,722,581 
45,848,532 
66,851,971 
6,408,121 
-14,595,318 
112,302,675 
-13.0% 
1996 1997 
0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 
16.75% 16.75% 
531,053,848 898,816,492 
88,951,520 150,551,762 
54,049,508 96,089,222 
18,026,588 18,261,583 
52,928,600 72,724,123 
175,181,921 265,783,875 
30.2% 27.4% 
4: Revenue includes loan interest income, penalty interest income, and revenues from loan 
application fees. 
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CHAPTER4. CASE STUDY: FECECAM 
I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE APEX 
When the government of Benin nationalized the banks in the 1970s, the Caisse Nationale de 
Credit Agricole (CNCA), was one of the public development bank set up in 1975 to disburse long-
term and agricultural loans to the population. By 1977, several local and regional credit unions, i.e., 
Caisses Locales de Credit Agricole Mutuel (CLCAMs), and Caisses Regionales de Credit Agricole 
Mutuel (CRCLCAMs) were created and placed under the supervision of CNCA which acted as the 
national federation of this network of credit unions. However, the CNCA adopted a top-down 
approach in its dealing with its member credit unions, excluding elected officials from management 
and decision making. By 1988, amidst a general collapse of the banking system in Benin, the CNCA 
was paralyzed by severe liquidity and mismanagement problems and went bankrupt. That situation 
resulted in the assets of all six CRCAM being frozen, and created a liquidity crisis for all 99 
CLCAMs in existence at that time. The CNCA was liquidated in 1989, but member CLCAMs 
continued to operate and collect member deposits during the crisis. Encouraged by the will of 
shareholders to salvage their institution, the government of Benin initiated a two-phase rehabilitation 
program with the financial support of international donors such as the French Cooperation, the Swiss 
Cooperation, and the World Bank. Phase one lasted three years (1990-1993) and ended with the 
creation in 1993 of the Federation des Caisses d'Epargne et de Credit Mutuel (FECECAM), an apex 
institution which inherited 42 CLCAMs, CF AF 17 million (US $ 68,000)15 in deposits, and CF AF 
12 million (US $ 48,000) in loans. Membership in the CLCAMs almost doubled during the 
restructuring from 20,800 in September 1989 to 40,000 in June 1992. Deposits increased 11 percent 
over the same period from CFAF 2.4 billion (US$ 9.6 million) to CFAF 3.1 billion (US$ 12.4 
million) (Fruman, 1997). 
Phase two of the restructuring program (1994-1998) is underway and FECECAM oversees 
today a network of seven Unions Regionales de Credit Agricole Mutuel (URCLCAMs), and 82 
CLCAMs. By September 1997, there were 210,651 shareholders, CFAF 17.7 billion (US$ 35.4 
million) in deposits, and CF AF 12.1 billion (US $ 24.2 million) in loans outstanding to 69,359 
borrowers. 
15 US$ 1=CFAF250 until the devaluation of the currency in January 1994. US$ 1 = CFAF 
500 thereafter. 
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II. STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION 
1. Mission 
The principal mission ofFECECAM is to coordinate the activities of its members, i.e., the 
CLCAMs and URCLCAMs, define the general policies of the network, provides technical assistance 
to network members, and manage excess liquidity generated by the network. One of FECECAM' s 
ultimate objective is to become a more effective Central Finance Facility (CFF) by engaging more 
directly in financial intermediation between surplus and deficit units and becoming an effective 
lender of last resort. Another crucial role for FECECAM is to see that the main objectives of the 
restructuring are met, i.e., bring the network to financial sustainability, and create an effective 
structure, the Technical Secretariat of the Federation (TSF) to supply technical support to member 
CLCAMs and URCLCAMs. 
2. Organizational Design 
Until recently, there were three levels of operation and management in the credit union 
network: the CLCAMs, URCLCAMs, and the Federation or FECECAM. However, starting in 1996, 
a fourth level has been added to the organization with the creation of the Caisses Vi/lageoises 
d'Epargne et de Credit (CVECs) located in villages (see organizational chart). 
The Caisses Vi/lageoises d'Epargne et de Credit (CVECs) 
The first CVECs were created in 1994 in the Oueme region is an effort to reach a greater 
number of the rural population by being closest to the potential clientele. By September 1997, there 
were 28 CVECs in as many villages in three out of seven Beninese regions. CVECs are run as an 
integral part of the CLCAM to which they depend. In fact, the same elected officials at the CLCAMs 
serve as management committee members at the CVECs and are responsible for loan granting. 
Although the CVECs mobilize their own savings, they benefit from the CLCAM resources for loans 
to their members. The objective of the CVEC is to grow to become a CLCAM in the future. 
The Caisses Locales de Credit Agricole Mutuel (CLCAMs) 
The CLCAMs are located primarily in rural towns, communes, and sub-prefectures. 
CLCAMs and are the pilar of the credit union network. They collect savings and grant loans to their 
members only. As of September 1997, there were 82 CLCAMs in as many towns all over Benin. 
Each CLCAM covers 20 to 30 villages. CLCAMs are organized around a general assembly of 
shareholders held once a year. At that time, members are elected to serve in the board of directors 
and a supervisory board. 
Membership: Originally created to provide agricultural loans to farmers only, today 
CLCAMs have outgrown their original mission and membership is a diverse mix that includes 
individuals especially microentrepreneurs as well as groups who reside or work in a community 
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served by the CLCAM. To become a member/shareholder, an individual is required to pay CF AF 
200 (US $ 0.40) in membership fee, and buy at least one share at CF AF 1,000 (US $ 2). A minimum 
of CF AF 5,000 (US $ 10) that buys five shares is required for a group. Opening an account requires 
a deposit of CFAF 5,000 (US$ 10) and three identification photos. Members can receive a loan if 
they save regularly, file a loan application, and are creditworthy. CLCAMs do not accept civil 
servants, and other private sector employees and organizations including NGOs as shareholders but 
they are allowed to open deposit accounts with the credit union. Thus, they can save but are not 
eligible for loans. 
Deposit Services: CLCAMs have a savings-first philosophy whereby deposits mobilized from 
members are used to grant loans to shareholders. There are three types of deposits accounts and they 
all require a minimum of CFAF 5,000 (US$ 10) deposit: 
• Current accounts earn no interest and are reserved for NGOs and other enterprises 
• Passbook accounts earn 3 percent annual interest rate 
• Term deposit accounts earn 4 percent annual interest rate, and 4.5 percent for longer term, 
i.e. greater than two years, deposit accounts. 
It is worth noting that commercial banks were paying 3.5 to 4.5 percent annual interest rates 
on deposit accounts in 1997. Thus, CLCAMs were paying less than the prevailing commercial rates, 
and in fact negative real rates of interest in an environment where the average inflation rate was 13 
percent except in 1994 when inflation reached more than 30 percent due to the devaluation of the 
currency. CLCAMs could allow themselves to pay those rates because they had no competition in 
rural areas where they are located. Even the two CLCAMs that opened in urban areas in Cotonou 
in 1994 attracted mainly microentrepreneurs and the general clientele that banks would not serve. 
Loan Services: CLCAMs offer several loan products to eligible members. They are: 
• Tout Petit Credit aux Femmes (J'PCF) or very small loans to women. It is the latest loan 
product offered to a group of women members. The amount varies between CFAF 10,000 
to CF AF 30,000 per woman for three to six months. Borrowers are not required to hold a 
deposit account with the CLCAM. 
• Short term loans of CF AF 10, 000 to CF AF 1 million are granted for a maximum of 12 
months. These loans are not targeted to any specific use and include emergency loans that 
are CF AF 50,000 on average. 
• Extended short term loans are granted for 24 months and range between CF AF 300,000 to 
CF AF 1 million. 
• Medium term loans are granted for 13 to 36 months for a maximum of CF AF 1 million. 
These loans are use to finance agricultural production and were made possible through lines 
of credit from IF AD and the African Development Bank (ADB). Repayment is expected in 
installments. 
CLCAMs currently use up to 70 percent of savings deposits as loan portfolio. Interest rates 
on loans are 10-17 percent annual depending on the CLCAM. A new CLCAM usually requires three 
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months of deposit mobilization before starting any loan activity and can use up to 50 percent of 
deposits as loan funds. Loan granting decisions are made by the board of directors of 9-15 people. 
The board of supervisors made up of five people is responsible for monitoring loan granting, and 
repayment. To be eligible for a loan, members must be with their institution for at least six months, 
have a minimum of CFAF 3,000 in their savings accounts except for TPCF, i.e., loans to women 
groups. Also 20 percent of the loan amount is required as guarantee in addition to other forms of 
physical collateral. In the future, loan amounts will rely less on a guarantee fund but depend more 
on the average amount of savings held over the past six months. This is a move in the right direction 
after management realized that members may well have been borrowing someplace else to be able 
to provide the 20 percent required guarantee. Thus, the CLCAM loan was becoming much more 
expensive to members than expected. Loans are granted to individuals as well as groups such as 
women and producer groups. Repayments can be made monthly, quarterly, annually or as a balloon 
payment for short-term loans. The average loan size remains CFAF 150,000 (US $ 300) for all 
CLCAMs. 
CLCAMs have accumulated some default in their loans because they did not master the 
group loan technology with TPCF. By September 1997, the total amount of delinquent loans was 
CF AF 953.6 million i.e. 7.9 percent of outstanding loan portfolio. Management hopes to lower 
delinquent loans to 2 percent of the portfolio by June 1998 and have thus stopped TPCF which 
technology they are revisiting. 
The Unions Regionales des CLCAMs (URCLCAMs) 
The URCLCAMs are at the second-tier level of the network and are located in the capital of 
each of the seven regions of Benin. Their role is to define the general policies of the CLCAMs in 
the particular region, manage excess liquidity from member CLCAMs and provide technical support 
and monitoring of their activities. Each URCLCAM also holds a general assembly once a year and 
is managed by a board of directors and supervisory board. Members of both boards are also board 
members of their respective CLCAMs. Each CLCAM in the region provides two of its elected 
management committee or board members to serve at the URCLCAM level. 
The Federation des Caisses d'Epargne et de Credit Mutuel (FECECAM) 
FECECAM was created as an apex organization with headquarters in Cotonou in July 1993. 
Membership at FECECAM is made up of URCLCAMs (7) whose members are individual 
CLCAMs. To become a member/shareholder, each URCLCAM must pay CF AF 1 million (US $ 
2,000) to the federation. Only URCLCAM can be shareholders and benefit from the followings: 
• Placement of their excess liquidity with the federation 
• Benefit from all the services (training, continuing education, and audit) performed by the 
federation 
• Participate in the general assembly and vote on major decisions 
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• Get a copy of all financial statements and reports from the board of directors and supervisory 
board of the federation 
FECECAM resources come from share capital, members current accounts and term deposit 
accounts, reserves, lines of credit, and grant subsidies. FECECAM earns 5.25 percent annual interest 
on its term deposit accounts with commercial banks and 4 percent on its current accounts. 
3. Ownership Structure 
As a credit union apex organization, FECECAM belongs to its members, i.e., the 
shareholders. The general assembly of shareholders remains the supreme body. FECECAM is 
structured like its member CLCAMs with a board of directors and an advisory board. Members of 
both boards are elected officials, active management committee or board members of their respective 
URCLCAMs and thus CLCAMs. They are all volunteers who receive a per-diem in the course of 
performing their duties. In addition, FECECAM employs 40 salaried employees under the 
supervision of en executive secretary who is the general manager. The manager and his staff are 
responsible for the day-to-day decisions, while the control of the organization belongs to the board 
of directors and ultimately to the general assembly of member-owners. 
The Board of Directors is made up of 15 members from several CLCAMs. Each CL CAM 
selects two elected officials to serve at the URCLCAM which in turn provides two representatives 
to serve at the federation level. The most profitable URCLCAM gets to select three representatives. 
The board of directors plays the role of the management committee and reports to the general 
assembly of shareholders. 
The Supervisory Board is made up of seven CLCAM officials elected for three years, 
renewable just once. The role of the board is to control all operational expenses, as well as monitor 
members of the board of directors. The supervisory board also reports to the general assembly of 
shareholders. 
The General Assembly of shareholders is held once a year and makes all the final decisions 
on general policy matters, and elects all board members who are responsible for implementing all 
the passed resolutions. Representatives at the general assembly of the federation include four 
members from each URCLCAM, i.e., two from the board of directors, and two from the supervisory 
board, and one member from each CLCAM. The general assembly must take place within eight 
months of the end of the fiscal year. Decisions made at the general assembly are binding to all 
members of the federation. 
4. Management/Staff Administration 
FECECAM is managed at the apex level by an executive secretary hired by the board of 
directors. The executive secretary supervises a staff of 40 salaried employees including 20 
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inspectors responsible for the monitoring and supervision of the seven URCLCAMs. These 
inspectors do not reside at the headquarters of the federation in Cotonou but instead work with the 
rest of the URCLAMs staff. The Technical Secretariat of the Federation (TSF) is the brain of the 
organization and includes four units: audit and inspection, network development, human resource 
development and training, accounting and financial operations. None of the salaried employees can 
be shareholders in the organization. The executive secretary is only responsible of the day-to-day 
management while control of the organization belongs to the elected board of directors. 
5. Governance Structure 
As with any credit union structure, there is an omnipresent conflict of interest and power 
struggle at FECECAM between the elected board members and staff member over governance 
issues. Paid staff members complain that their advices on professional and technical matters are not 
taken into account by elected board members. Members of the board of directors who have ultimate 
control of the organization may be overstepping their role in an effort to keep abreast of all 
developments within the organization and by fear that the staff might not work in the best interest 
of the shareholders. The souvenir of the failed CNCA due to mismanagement is still fresh in the 
board's memory. Ultimately such an atmosphere of mistrust where the staff feels unappreciated and 
unmotivated is very unproductive. One way FECECAM is trying to solve the governance issue and 
alleviate the power struggle is to engage more dialogue between both parties by undertaking some 
CLCAM visits together and coming up with possible solutions to problems together. Seminars have 
also been organized and sponsored by donors on how to achieve a better relationship between staff 
and elected board members. At the time of the field visit for this report, the staff at FECECAM felt 
like relations were improving and that their views were being increasingly considered in the 
management of the organization. 
III. APEX POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 
1. Selection of Clients 
FECECAM clients are the URCLCAMs and their membership, i.e., individual CLCAMs. 
However, only URCLCAMs are considered shareholders of the federation. Among the services 
FECECAM performs for its clients are: 
• Control, audit, and inspection 
• Technical support, training, and promotion 
• General supervision 
• Application of prudential ratios and other financial regulations 
The Technical Secretariat of the Federation has created seven regional audit and inspection 
units run by one inspector and an assistant. Although each CLCAM is free to define its policies on 
loan and deposits, the federation helps URCLCAMs enforce whatever policies they have agreed on. 
FECECAM services to URCLCAM are being subsidized for now but will not be free in the future. 
38 
FECECAM is not a full Central Financing Facility and it grants loans at 7 percent annual 
interest rate only to URCLCAMs that have a liquidity problem from a line of credit created by 
accumulated surplus funds from all URCLCAMs. FECECAM then requires that the borrower 
deposit 50 percent of the loan amount in a term deposit account with the federation, as a risk 
management measure. The URCLCAM then grants loans to their member CLCAMs at 8 percent 
annual interest rate. The ultimate borrowers, i.e., the CLCAM shareholders get their loans at 13-17 
percent annual interest rate. 
2. Monitoring and Risk Management 
Monitoring of the network is performed through the TSF according to a well thought 
scenario. First, since September 1997, every URCLCAM has its audit and inspection unit with its 
own team of two resident inspectors who periodically review all individual member CLCAMs. Any 
CLCAM with more than 5 percent loan default is suspended from further loan activity until the 
situation improves. There is one inspector and an assistant per seven CLCAMs who helps the credit 
unions monitor their loans and deal immediately with any delinquency. Of course internal control 
of the CLCAM is one of the prime responsibilities of the supervisory board who monitors also the 
activities of the board of directors. Second, twice a year, a team of three people including the 
regional inspector, the assistant from another region, and the chief-accountant undertake cross visits 
of the CLCAMs and CVECs. That allows FECECAM to double check and cross check its inspectors 
and minimize any attempt to defraud the organization by accomplices from the same region. This 
is all part of a five-point chain of control of the network that include: 
• Control by the CLCAM supervisory board 
• Control by local CLCAM accountants 
• Control by the URCLCAM chief regional accountant 
• Control by FECECAM regional inspectors 
• Control by an external auditor 
This five-point chain of control put in place since 1993 is meant to identify problem areas 
early on and also to help credit union members produce reliable and complete financial records, 
especially for those CLCAMs which are not yet computerized. 
3. Accounting and Management Information System (MIS) 
While all URCLCAMs are computerized, most CLCAMs are not. Computerization of the 
whole network would allow the production of more accurate information and financial data and 
make monitoring by TSF a little easier. It would allow the network to save time and money while 
ensuring better performance. The accounting system at FECECAM relies on INFOCOOPEC which 
is a software that has proved very successful with other credit union networks such as the one in 
Togo. However, FECECAM seems to have outgrown INFOCOOPEC but has not developed its own 
system yet. Of course the need of a well adapted accounting package is crucial, especially in a 
growing organization and the sooner FECECAM hires someone to develop an internal system, as 
recommended by an external consultant, the smoother the rest of the system units and departments 
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would run. For an organization who wants to take advantage of the new P ARMEC law16 and 
transform itself into a true financial intermediary, it is crucial to possess a management system that 
would help deal with the complexities involved in conforming with the BCEA017 accounts 
regulations. 
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE APEX 
1. Growth and Expansion 
FECECAM inherited of 42 CLCAMs in 1993 and have seen a tremendous growth in its 
membership ever since. FECECAM oversees today the largest credit union network in West Africa. 
The number of CLCAMs then increased 52 percent to reach 64 CLCAMs in December 1996. By 
September 1997, there were 82 CLCAMs (28 percent increase) and seven regional units or 
URCLCAMs have also been created in all the seven regions of the country. Each URCLCAM has 
an average membership of eleven CLCAMs. The number of shareholders grew from 182,57 4 in 
December 1996 to 210,651 in September 1997, representing a 15.4 percent increase (Table 1). 
Deposits increased 31.5 percent in real terms from 1995 to 1996. Deposits reached 17.7 billion (US 
$ 35.4 million) in September 1997. The real growth in loans outstanding was 48.2 percent from 
1995 to 1996. By September 1997, the loan outstanding amount 12.1 billion (US$ 24.2 million). 
The total number ofloans increased from 62,054 in 1995 to 69,359 in 1997 representing an 11.8 
percent increase. The large increase in outstanding loan portfolio that occured between 1995 and 
1996 from CF AF 6. 7 million in December 1995 to CF AF 10.5 billion in December 1996 was due 
to some relaxations in the loan policy and introduction of a group loan technology. Unfortunately, 
that resulted in an increase of 162 percent in the number of delinquent loans that the CLCAMs are 
still trying to recover. The lesson to be learnt in this case is that growth must not be realized at all 
cost and especially at the expense of good financial and prudential management. 
The growth projection for the year 2001 is to reach 100 CLCAMs, 140 CVECs, 500,000 
shareholders, CF AF 43 billion (US $ 86 million) in 1 billion deposits accounts, and CF AF 36 billion 
(US $ 72 million) in loans. The projected number of CLCAMs indicates a 22 percent growth which 
is in line with previous growth data. However, loans would have to increase by 197 .5 percent over 
a period of four years, i.e., a yearly increase of 50 percent. The last time such an increase occurred, 
it was also followed by a large delinquency rate and it can only be expected that FECECAM has 
learnt some lessons and will not trade off good management practices for reaching an unrealistic 
goal. 
16 
17 
The P ARMEC law is the new law governing all mutualist and other microfinance 
organizations in several Francophone African countries. 
BCEAO is the regional West African Central Bank. 
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2. Outreach 
The CLCAMs are primarily located in rural areas, and with 210,651 shareholders in 
September 1997, they were reaching close to 15 percent of the rural active population in Benin. That 
is quite an achievement for any financial organization, especially in Africa. The average deposit size 
was CFAF 83,894 (US$ 167.8) and with CFAF 17.7 billion (US$ 35.4 million) in deposits in 
September 1997, CLCAMs were second only to the largest commercial bank in Benin as far as 
deposit mobilization is concerned. Loans were granted to 69,359 members, i.e., 33 percent of the 
membership. The resulting average loan size in the network was CFAF 174,455 (US $ 349) 
representing 83 percent of the GDP of$418 in 1996. This also indicates that CLCAMs do not cater 
to the poorest in Benin nor to the rich. The strategy to reach more of the poor is embedded in the 
creation ofCVECs that are located in villages and thus closest to the rural poor. Also group loans 
to women via TPCF have an average loan size of CF AF 20,000 (US $ 20) and cater thus to a much 
poorer segment of the population. 
3. Sustainability 
Repayment Performance 
The performance of FECECAM can be assessed via the performance of its member 
CLCAMs. Up to December 1995, the repayment rate in all CLCAMs was 98 percent. As a result of 
some bad loans made in 1996, repayment rate went down to 94 percent. Out of 64 CLCAMs in 
operation that year, only five were in deficit. However, in September 1997, repayment rate 
decreased further to 92 percent with CFAF 953.6 million (US $ 1.9 million) in delinquent loan 
amount. Management at FECECAM hopes to decrease the percent of delinquent loans from 7.9 
percent to 2 percent by June 1998, but it is not very clear what is being done to reach that goal. 
At the apex level, all loans granted to URCLCAMs have been repaid in full. Since 
FECECAM has granted very few loans, it is premature to reach a general conclusion on its 
performance. 
Operational Self-sufficiency 
The balance sheet and income statement for FECECAM are in Tables 2 and 3. The most 
basic indicator of operational efficiency examines the organization's operating costs as a percentage 
of its average loan portfolio. This ratio reveals how much it costs the organization to lend one unit 
of its funds. Very high ratios of 378 percent in 1995 and 140.3 percent in 1996 were found at 
FECECAM. Thus, in 1996, FECECAM operational expenses were 140.3 percent of average 
outstanding portfolio meaning that CFAF 1.4 was spent for every CFAF 1 earned that year. These 
high ratios can be explained by the fact that FECECAM engages in very little loan activities while 
running a very costly technical assistance operation for member CLCAMs. 
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Operational self-sufficiency18 examines the organization's ability to cover its operational 
costs with its operating income. Ratios at FECECAM were 52.5 percent in 1995 and 74.0 percent 
in 1996 indicating that the apex was increasingly being able to cover its operational costs by income 
generated from its activities. However, FECECAM was still unable to totally cover its operational 
costs, and for every CF AF 1 of expenses in 1996, FECECAM generated CF AF 0. 74 in income. 
Aggregate profitability is typically measured in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE). The higher the return, the better. As shown in Table 2, ratios were very small in 
1995 and 1996. ROA was 0.2 percent in 1996, indicating net income ofCFAF 0.002 per CFAF 1 
of assets owned during the year. ROE of 1.8 percent in 1996 indicates that net income of CF AF 
0.018 was generated per CFAF 1 of equity owned that year. These very small ratios show that 
FECECAM was not a very profitable apex organization. However, that is not surprising given the 
nature of this apex which is engaged in a very small loan activity and channels mainly donor funds 
as grants to its members. In order to become a profitable institution, FECECAM would have to 
engage in more loan activities, charging positive real rates of interest, and also charging members 
and others for its technical assistance services. 
Financial Self-Sufficiency and SDI Measures for FECECAM 
The performance and sustainability of FECECAM depends on its financial self-sufficiency, 
i.e., its ability to generate sufficient income not only to cover its operational costs of the organization 
but its financial costs as well. Performing a cost-structure analysis is the most comprehensive 
approach to analyzing the financial performance of an organization and involves the calculation of 
the net operating margin. Negative ratios of-21.3 percent in 1995 and-7.9 percent in 1996 indicate 
that FECECAM is not covering actual costs with income derived from its fmancial operations (Table 
2). FECECAM did not earn any interest on loans made to CLCAMs but was able to generate 
revenues from its performing assets which are deposit accounts held at commercial banks (see 
income statement). Obviously, that was not enough to cover its overall costs. 
The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI). 
To find out how much FECECAM relies on donor subsidies to perform its activities, it is 
necessary to calculate the Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI). The objective of the SDI is to provide 
a comprehensive method of assessing and measuring the overall financial costs involved in operating 
a microfinance organization (MFO) and quantifying its subsidy dependence. The SDI is a ratio that 
measures the percentage increase in the average on-lending interest rate required to compensate an 
MFO for the elimination of subsidies in a given year while keeping its return on equity equal to the 
approximate non concessional borrowing cost. The index assumes, for simplicity, that an increase 
in the on-lending interest rate is the only change made to compensate for loss of subsidy. An SDI 
of zero assumes that a MFO achieved full self-sustainability. An SDI of 100 percent indicates that 
18 Operational self-sufficiency is total operating income over operating expenses and loan loss 
provision. 
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a doubling of the average on-lending interest rate is required if subsidies are to be eliminated. 
Similarly, an SDI of200 percent indicates that a threefold increase in the on-lending interest rate is 
required to compensate for the subsidy elimination. (Gurgand, Pederson, and Yaron, 1994). 
Using available information for 1995 and 1996, only the SDI for 1995 yielded a very high 
figure of 11,290 percent. No figure was obtained for 1996 because FECECAM did not generate any 
loan interest income. All funds to members CLCAMs were donor grants channeled at zero interest. 
However, if 1995 is any indication, FECECAM would need to increase its interest rate to incredible 
proportions to be subsidy independent. Since the SDI focuses solely on the interest rate as a 
management tool, it is questionable whether it should be applied to an apex institution such as 
FECECAM which primary activity is geared towards providing technical assistance rather than 
granting loans. The SDI may become relevant once FECECAM transforms itself into a pure 
financial intermediary, which it plans to do in the near future. 
V. CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL FOR FECECAM 
1. Problems Faced and Lessons Learned 
From the beginning, FECECAM was confronted with the problem of restoring public 
confidence in the credit union network in Benin. The tremendous growth achieved by the CLCAMs 
over the years proved that FECECAM has achieved that first goal. However other challenges remain 
such as how to achieve an even deeper outreach and how to achieve financial sustainability of itself 
and its network. To reach more rural poor population, FECECAM would need to create more 
CVECs, i.e., organizations closest to the target population and that requires additional funds that may 
come from its own operations or donor subsidies. 
2. Role and Challenges for FECECAM 
FECECAM oversees the most impressive network of credit unions in West Africa. As an 
apex organization, FECECAM plays a very important role in institution building of its members. It 
plays an equally important role as a supervisor and or regulator of members CLCAMs. The biggest 
challenge remains for FECECAM to become an effective CFF and become a lender of last resort for 
its membership. Transforming into a real financial intermediary as is required by the CFF status calls 
for FECECAM to become financially sustainable. 
3. Future Direction for FECECAM 
The future direction for FECECAM calls for reaching financial sustainability. That can be 
achieved by several means under the transformation under CFF scenario. First, FECECAM can 
generate substantial revenues by intermediating between surplus and deficit units and granting loans 
at real positive rates of interest to members. Second, FECECAM can start charging for the services 
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it renders. That would generate much needed funds. However, it is not known whether member 
CLCAMs can afford to pay for the full costs of services yet. 
4. Implications for Donors: Should Apex be supported/replicated? 
To pursue the future ofFECECAM as an apex organization, donors would have to answer 
the following questions: 
• Was FECECAM successful in some sense as an apex organization? 
• What was FECECAM' s contribution to the development of sustainable capacity at the retail 
microfinance level in Benin? 
FECECAM's success as an apex organization is obvious. The contribution to the 
development of sustainable capacity at the retail level is well documented. However, it is limited to 
a network of organizations have similar features and would present less challenges comparatively 
if FECECAM had to expand its operations to other MF Os with different organizational designs. 
The lessons that can be learnt from the experience of FECECAM are the challenges faced 
by an apex organization that oversees similar organizations and provides mainly free technical 
assistance. We do not know what happens when such an organization is also a real financial 
intermediary, lender of last resort. Could both activities be successfully managed by the same staff? 
What king of management would it take for such multiple tasks? 
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Table 1. Performance Indicators for FECECAM Membership (CLCAMs) 
Number of shareholders 
Deposits (CFAF) 
Real deposits (1990 CF AF) 
Real deposit growth 
Loan portfolio (CF AF) 
Real loan amount (1990 CFAF) 
Real loan growth 
Number of loans 
Delinquent loans (CF AF) 
Source: FECECAM 
Note: 1: September 1997 
1995 1996 
132,715 182,574 
9,269,626,458 12,789,557,060 
5,594,222,365 7,358,778,516 
-- 31.5% 
6,751,595,705 10,494,548,939 
4,074,590,045 6,03 8,290,529 
-- 48.2% 
52,659 62,054 
149,531,563 609 ,687 ,881 
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19971 
210,651 
17,672,227'197 
--
--
12,065,968,421 
--
--
69,359 
953,601,125 
Table 2. Measuring FECECAM Operational Efficiency 
1995 1996 
Financial expenses (CFAF) 290,575,659 298,578,004 
Operating Expenses (CFAF) 600,989,198 454,437,968 
Total Expenses (CFAF) 891,564,857 753,015,972 
Financial Income 1 315,378,733 323,048,296 
Operating income2 315,378,736 336,346, 179 
Total Income (CFAF) 909,961,337 764,007,184 
Net Income (CFAF) 18,396,480 10,991,212 
Financial Assets 5,314,238,655 5,382,200,098 
Avg. Total Assets 2, 708,808, 153 5,455,300,859 
Avg. Total Equity 300,208, 134 612,010, 707 
Total Liabilities 4,817,199,037 4,869,380,268 
Avg. Outstanding portfolio (CFAF) 159,000,000 324,000,000 
Operating Expenses/ Avg.Outstanding Portfolio 378.0% 140.3% 
Operational Self-sufficiency3 52.5% 74.0% 
ROA4 0.7% 0.2% 
ROE5 6.1% 1.8% 
Gross Financial Margin6 0.9% 0.4% 
Net Operating margin7 -21.3% -7.9% 
Source: FECECAM report 
Notes: 1 : Operating expenses are equal to personnel expenses, administrative expenses, including 
2 
3 • 
4 • 
5 
6 
7 
depreciation of fixed assets. They do not include financial costs and loan loss provisions. 
Financial income = income from interest and loan fees 
Operational self-sufficiency = Financial income /Financial + Operating Costs + Loan 
loss provision 
ROA = Net income/Avg. Total assets 
ROE= Net income/Avg. Total equity 
Gross Financial Margin = (Financial income - Financial Costs) I Avg. Total assets 
Net Operating Margin = Gross Financial margin - Operating costs I Avg. Total Assets 
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ANNEX 1. 
Consolidated Balance Sheet Data for FECECAM (Amounts in CFAF) 
12-31-95 12-31-96 
ASSETS 
Cash 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Due from banks 4,662,435,230 4,352,318,410 
Loans to CLCAMs 318,000,000 330,000,000 
Earning (performing) Assets 4,981,435,230 4,683,318,410 
Security Deposits & Guarantees 2,398,500 2,398,500 
Other Financial Assets 142, 172,428 511,205,520 
Misc. Receivables 188,232,497 185,277,668 
Fixed Assets (Plant) 510,087 132,499 
Fixed Assets (Land and Equipment) 102,867,563 110,652,816 
TOTAL ASSETS S,417,61~,J05 S,492,985,413 
LIABILITIES & OWNER'S EQUITY 
URCLCAM current accounts 4 70,311,995 725,928,219 
URCLCAM Deposit accounts 3,843,100,000 3,413, 100,000 
Interest payable 59,347,041 28,765,653 
Other liabilities 406,033,840 650, 110,062 
Accounts payable 38,406,161 51,476,334 
Total Liabilities 4,817,199,037 4,869,380,268 
Share Capital 6,000,000 6,000,000 
Donor Invest. subsidy grants 432,178,106 444,375,771 
Reserves 143,841,682 162,238,162 
Year-end Net Income 18,396,480 10,991,212 
Total Equity 600,416,268 623,605,145 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & OWNER'S 
EQUITY S,417,615,J05 S,422,985,413 
Source: FECECAM 
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ANNEX2. 
Consolidated Income Statement Data for FECECAM (Amounts in CFAF) 
12-31-95 12-31-96 
INCOME 
Interest Income on current accounts 22,596,869 36,350,294 
Interest income on term deposit accounts 287,232,992 286,698,002 
Loan Interest income 5,548,872 0 
Income from performing assets 315,378,733 323,048,296 
Equipment Subsidies 53,763,525 45,805,095 
Operational Subsidies 540,819,076 381,855,910 
Surplus on sale of equipment 3 12,375,716 
Exceptional surplus 0 922,167 
Other Income 594,582,604 440,036,721 
TOTAL INCOME 909.961,J37 764.007.184 
EXPENSES 
Interest paid on current accounts 48,621,961 70,420,914 
Interest paid on term deposit accounts 241,953,698 227,377,465 
Loan Interest expense 0 290,424 
Commissions 0 489,201 
Financial Expenses 290,575,659 298,578,004 
Salary expenses 74,910,269 65,400,302 
Material Purchases 23,239,534 26,050,780 
Per-diem expenses 51,099,996 45,039,519 
Other external charges 392, 734, 178 252,713,740 
Depreciation expenses 53,822,631 45,805,095 
Exceptional charges 5,042,490 19,428,532 
Adjustment 140,000 0 
Operating expenses 600,989,198 454,437,968 
TOTAL EXPENSES 891.564.857 753.015.972 
NET INCOME 18,396,480 10,991,212 
Source: FECECAM 
Note: 1: Other income includes loan application and processing fees, and income on clients' deposits 
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ANNEX3. 
Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) 
Computation of the SDI: 
SDI= s 
where: 
S=A(m -c) +[(E *m)-p] +K 
and: 
S = Annual subsidy received by the MFO; 
A= MFO concessional borrowed funds outstanding (annual average); 
m = Interest rate the MFO would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds if access to borrowed concessional funds 
were eliminated; 
c = Weighted average annual concessional rate of interest actually paid by the MFO on its average annual 
concessional borrowed funds outstanding; 
E = Average annual equity; 
P = Reported annual profit (before tax) (adjusted, when necessary, for loan loss provisions, inflation, etc.); 
K = The sum of all other annual subsidies received by the MFO (such as partial or complete coverage of the MFO's 
operational costs by the state); 
LP= Average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the MFO; 
I = Weighted average on-lending interest rate earned on the loan portfolio of the MFO. 
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Table 1. Calculating SDI over the years for FECECAM1 
Item 1995 1996 
Concessional borrowing = A 0 0 
Concessional rate of interest paid by MFO=c 0.0% 0.0% 
Market lending rate = m 16.75% 16.75% 
Annual average equity = E 300,208, 134• 612,010,707 
Subsidy on equity = (E*m) 50,284,862 102,511,793 
Profits = P (losses) 18,396,480 10,991,212 
Grants and Benefits = K 594,582,601 427,661,005 
Total subsidy = S 626,470,983 519,181,586 
Revenue from lending= LP*i 5,548,872 0 
SDI 11290.1% ?? 
Source: Fececam Financial Statements 
Note: 1: All absolute amounts are in CFAF 
•: Average annual equity for 1995 was calculated by assuming zero for 1994 due to unavailable data. 
In 1996, FECECAM did not generate any interest income because loans were granted to CLCAMs at no interest 
from donor grants funds. 
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Figure 3. FECECAM Organizational Design 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this report was to analyze some apex organizations in Africa, and in Benin 
in particular. The main questions the report tried to answer are the following: 
• Was the organization successful in some sense as an apex organization? 
• What was the organization's contribution to the development of sustainable capacity at the 
retail microfinance level in Benin? 
I. LESSONS LEARNED FROM P ADME 
In the case of P ADME, the report portrayed an organization whose success could only be 
evaluated with respect to its first-tier activities, i.e., granting direct loans to microentrepreneurs. 
PADME successfully reached more than 7,000 entrepreneurs and was able to achieve operational 
self-sufficiency in just four years of operation. 
PADME's success as an apex organization was more difficult to assess given the limitation 
in time and scale of its second-tier operations with local NGOs. The contribution of PADME to the 
development of sustainable capacity at the retail level has been also very minimum. First, most 
partner NGOs lacked basic knowledge and skills to successfully undertake microfinance activities. 
Second, P ADME was not equipped to deal with institution building on a large scale, and third, it did 
not interact long enough with the NGOs to make a lasting impression and difference. 
The lessons that can be learnt from the experience of P ADME are directly related to 
organizational design. This is the case of inappropriate organization design for a particular activity. 
P ADME was not originally designed to be an apex organization. It was used as a second-best 
solution by another donor to expand microfinancial services to rural areas. P ADME served, thus, as 
a conduit for donor funds to alleviate some funds constraints. While this did not prove completely 
disastrous, several main question still remain. Can and should P ADME be used as an apex 
organization in Benin and for what specific purpose? If PADME were to be used as an apex 
organization, its main role would be to strengthen the capacity of the few MF Os in the country and 
help other NGOs become microfinance intermediaries. That sounds like a very difficult and costly 
proposition that would require providing P ADME itself with not only the funds but the personnel 
to carry the training as well. Several elements do not support the creation of an apex organization 
at this time in Benin. First, the size of the retail market, that is the number of MFOs that are 
potential clients of P ADME, is very small. Economies of scale cannot be generated in the 
wholesaling function of the apex if it has to deal in a market of less than 20 partner retailers. 
Second, the majority of potential retail partners are NGOs with very limited experience, if any, in 
microfinance. The BINGOS program managed by Africare had provided financial support to 22 
local NGOs of 11 were involved in microfinance activities by the end of 1996. However, most of 
these 11 NGOs merely used microfinance as a mean to attain their primary objectives which range 
from health and nutrition, literacy training, professional continuing education, community 
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development, environmental protection, and food security. A study19 of the 11 NGOs that dealt in 
microfinance with funds from Africare revealed the followings: 
• Only two NGOs focused on microfinance as their primary activity 
• Most NGOs have no organized structure for savings and loan activities 
• There is a lack of qualified personnel with microfinance experience both at the management 
and staff levels. 
The study recommended that different strategies may be needed to improve the performance 
ofNGOs dealing in microfinance. Upgrade NGOs into microfinance organizations; Provide support 
to struggling microfinance NGOs; Strengthen the capacity of the fewNGOs with some microfinance 
experience. 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PADME 
Undoubtedly, the role of an apex in upgrading exercise of an NGO into an MFO which 
require a more demanding institution building exercise is more difficult to support and justify. A 
better alternative would be for donors to support PADME's first-tier operations and help it expand 
given that it has the right technology and accumulated experience, and knowledge. In fact, given 
PADME's current partnership with a commercial bank, i.e., financial bank of Benin, could be 
carefully analyzed in a context of a downgrading exercise for the bank. It should finally be 
recognized that in Benin, the limited available human capital for microfinance is concentrated at the 
first-tier level and thus, it would be most profitable to the industry to provide direct support to first 
tier MFOs instead of using an apex to promote NGOs that are unsustainable. 
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM FECECAM 
The lessons learned from the experience of FECECAM are of a different nature. First, 
FECECAM is a credit union apex organization which manage organizations that are uniform in their 
design and operations. While it has successfully brought back consumer's confidence in the 
microfmance industry, achieved some noticeable outreach and operational self-sufficiency, is it the 
right tool to address the expansion of the micro finance frontier? The challenge for FECECAM is 
already great and consists in bringing its network to financial sustainability and successfully 
transforming itself into a financial intermediary. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FECECAM 
FECECAM would not be the right instrument to expand the frontier of microfinance by 
expanding its activities to other MFOs, most of whom are inexperienced NGOs. FECECAM has 
more than enough organizations to deal with and should be kept as apex organization serving its 
19 
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member credit unions. NGOs in Benin do not have either the capacity or the experience to deliver 
microfinance services in a sustainable manner. Thus, the demand for financial services by the 
population in Benin is still largely unmet and helping to reach more people through structured 
organizations like credit unions might be a better strategy. Economies of scale could be quickly 
realized by helping FECECAM to expand its network and outreach using a well known and 
successful methodology. A collaboration between some microfinance NGOs and FECECAM can 
also be feasible to create more CVECs following the model of Freedom from Hunger in establishing 
village banks. The present projected growth of the network to attain 107 CLCAMs and 144 CVECs 
by the year 2001 calls for continued donor subsidies of US $ 20,000 to US $ 50, 000 (Fruman, 1997). 
While donor support is needed, it should be carefully administered such that it does not conflict with 
the primary mission of credit unions, i.e., deposits mobilization. Donor funds should continue to 
support capacity building of retail credit union organizations, giving the time to FECECAM to 
achieve its goal of financial institution, a first step in becoming financially self-sufficient. Donor 
support should also be accompanied by a careful monitoring of the apex to achieve even better 
performance, and stay competitive by developing better management tools, minimizing costs, and 
improving services and products for its clientele. Ultimately, FECECAM future well-being is 
heavily dependent on how carefully it manages growth taking into account its ability to deliver its 
services in a professional and sustainable manner. 
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